Although climate science offers strong evidence for anthropogenic change, its effectiveness in public debates is often undermined by a misguided ideal: that science should be pure, neutral and infallible. This column critiques the cultural perception of science as a monolithic truth-telling machine, exposing how this vision fosters frustration when science enters the messy terrain of political and social contention. The scientific method, often depicted as a linear and infallible path to truth, is here reframed as a flexible and context-sensitive practice, reliant on collective interpretation and methodological pluralism. Drawing on Karen Kovaka's and Lee McIntyre's contributions, the text dismantles the notion of science as a producer of final truths, highlighting instead the plausibility of its claims as a more honest epistemic strategy. Through the lens of climate attribution studies—used to estimate the role of human activity in extreme weather events like the DANA flood—the column demonstrates how climate science operates not by pronouncing absolute certainties but by presenting highly justified, community-vetted assessments. A key example is the IPCC’s consensual diagnosis of climate change, which does not rely on metaphysical truths but on a wide convergence of data, models, and expert judgement. Therefore, rather than appealing to a "science that says," the author urges a humble, situated engagement with scientific knowledge, one that recognises its historical, social and value-laden dimensions. This approach not only fortifies public understanding but also disarms climate denialism, which thrives on attacking an idealised and unattainable version of science. In facing the ecological crisis, it is not certainty we must seek, but accountable, collaborative plausibility.
