Scholarly systems have become remarkably good at identifying containers and comparatively poor at identifying the intellectual objects that move through them. A paper can have a DOI, a researcher an ORCID and an institution a persistent record, while a concept that travels through dozens of documents still has to be reconstructed through keywords, quotations, citations and disciplinary memory. This asymmetry mattered less when the publication was the principal unit through which knowledge was discovered and reused. It matters much more now that search engines return passages, knowledge graphs extract relations, retrieval systems assemble fragments and language models process recurrent formulations detached from their original documentary sequence. Under these conditions, the concept itself begins to behave like an infrastructural object: it can recur, be revised, migrate between disciplines, acquire new applications and remain recognizable even when no single document contains its whole history. A persistent semantic address would not turn concepts into fixed definitions. Its purpose would be almost the opposite: to distinguish continuity of identity from continuity of formulation. The address could remain stable while definitions, examples, relations and interpretations evolve around it. Such an arrangement would make it possible to ask not merely where a term appears, but how a concept has changed, which version is current, what earlier formulations remain active and which relations are structural rather than incidental. This is a modest technical shift with a larger epistemological consequence. Scholarship would no longer appear only as a library of bounded publications but also as a field of identifiable intellectual objects passing through those publications. A durable address without a visible history could stabilize confusion as efficiently as it stabilizes knowledge. The deeper problem is consequently not how to freeze meaning, but how to preserve the continuity of an idea while keeping its transformations inspectable. A concept becomes computationally legible without ceasing to be historically and interpretively alive.
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