Haraway reframes vision as embodied and political, arguing that only partial perspectives yield accountable objectivity within power-laden knowledge systems.

In Situated Knowledges, Donna Haraway advances a radical reconceptualisation of vision as a material-semiotic practice, dismantling the epistemological fiction of disembodied sight. Rather than endorsing the traditional “god trick” of seeing everything from nowhere, Haraway insists that all vision is embodied, technologically mediated, and politically situated, thereby rendering objectivity a function of accountable positioning rather than transcendental detachment. As elaborated in the section “The Persistence of Vision” (pp. 7–9), visual systems—from biological eyes to satellite imaging—do not passively record reality but actively construct it through specific apparatuses of perception . This insight destabilises the assumption that vision guarantees epistemic neutrality; instead, it reveals how visual technologies amplify regimes of power, particularly those aligned with militarism, capitalism, and colonial expansion. Haraway’s illustrative examples—from microscopic imaging to planetary surveillance—demonstrate that all seeing is a practice of interpretation, embedded within historically contingent networks of meaning and domination. Crucially, she posits that “only partial perspective promises objective vision” (p. 9), thereby redefining objectivity as limited, locatable, and responsible knowledge rather than universal truth. The conceptual synthesis culminates in her assertion that feminist epistemology must reclaim vision not by rejecting it, but by re-embedding it within the body and its socio-technical extensions. Ultimately, Haraway concludes that true objectivity emerges through the ethical acknowledgment of one’s position within power-laden fields of vision, transforming perception into a site of critical accountability rather than epistemic illusion.

Rethinking scientific authority in climate discourse means shifting from absolute truths to plausible, collective justifications

Although climate science offers strong evidence for anthropogenic change, its effectiveness in public debates is often undermined by a misguided ideal: that science should be pure, neutral and infallible. This column critiques the cultural perception of science as a monolithic truth-telling machine, exposing how this vision fosters frustration when science enters the messy terrain of political and social contention. The scientific method, often depicted as a linear and infallible path to truth, is here reframed as a flexible and context-sensitive practice, reliant on collective interpretation and methodological pluralism. Drawing on Karen Kovaka's and Lee McIntyre's contributions, the text dismantles the notion of science as a producer of final truths, highlighting instead the plausibility of its claims as a more honest epistemic strategy. Through the lens of climate attribution studies—used to estimate the role of human activity in extreme weather events like the DANA flood—the column demonstrates how climate science operates not by pronouncing absolute certainties but by presenting highly justified, community-vetted assessments. A key example is the IPCC’s consensual diagnosis of climate change, which does not rely on metaphysical truths but on a wide convergence of data, models, and expert judgement. Therefore, rather than appealing to a "science that says," the author urges a humble, situated engagement with scientific knowledge, one that recognises its historical, social and value-laden dimensions. This approach not only fortifies public understanding but also disarms climate denialism, which thrives on attacking an idealised and unattainable version of science. In facing the ecological crisis, it is not certainty we must seek, but accountable, collaborative plausibility.