Robert Brandom argues that meaning and conceptual content should be understood through inference rather than representation. His central claim is that to grasp a concept is not primarily to attach a word to an object, but to know how that concept functions within practices of giving and asking for reasons. Brandom calls this position inferentialism: the content of a claim depends on what follows from it, what would count as a reason for it, and what commitments it entails. Against representationalist theories of language, he gives priority to reasoning, assertion, and norm-governed discursive practice. Concepts are therefore not isolated mental items or labels, but nodes within a social and inferential network. To say that something is “red,” for example, is to undertake commitments concerning colour, perception, incompatibility, and possible further claims. Brandom also develops logical expressivism, according to which logic makes explicit the inferential relations already implicit in ordinary language. His account is pragmatist because meaning arises from use, but rationalist because the relevant use is specifically the normative practice of justifying, challenging, and defending commitments. The conclusion is that human mindedness is essentially discursive: we are concept-users because we participate in social practices where reasons are articulated, assessed, and made explicit.
