Showing posts with label AI epistemology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AI epistemology. Show all posts

Sunday, November 8, 2026

The most consequential transformation in contemporary computational culture may not be the production of synthetic images or texts, but the reorganisation of the interval between a documented proposition and its possible interpretations. Modern knowledge systems have repeatedly treated their instruments as if they were models of thought itself: the machine as explanation of order, the organism as explanation of integration, language as explanation of structure. Pasquinelli’s comparative epistemology exposes the historical and political work performed by these transfers, locating computational models within the abstractions of culture, cooperation and labour rather than in the fiction of a newly animated artefact. The distinction is decisive. A document does not reason because it contains reasons; a database does not deliberate because it stores decisions; a generative system does not acquire a human biography because it can produce sentences resembling those of a scholar.

Nevertheless, the operations linking documents, researchers and computational models can alter the circumstances in which problems are formulated. This is the more exact site of computational reciprocity. Its two sides are not equivalent: on one side, people establish questions, choose criteria, encounter places and accept responsibility; on the other, trained systems retrieve, rank, classify, transform and generate representations according to their technical architectures and deployment conditions. These operations may be mutually consequential without being biologically symbiotic. Manovich’s account of generative AI as a medium gives this relation formal specificity. Probabilistic variation enlarges the field of available comparisons while making exact control difficult; extensive cultural patterning makes certain associations readily available while potentially favouring aesthetic or conceptual convention. An unexpected comparison is therefore not evidence of insight until its source, scope and exclusions are examined. This difficulty also changes the question of artistic agency. Bomba and De Angeli use situated studio practice to contest a model of authorship in which all causality originates within a solitary individual; Rozental and de Rooij likewise show why the opposition between passive tool and independent collaborator neglects the prolonged adjustments made in practice. Neither argument requires treating software as conscious. Their most transferable insight concerns the distributed circumstances of production, which should not be confused with distributed ethical responsibility.