Munné challenges the expectation that human conduct can be described adequately through a single, stable set of explanatory relations. His reconstruction of complexity brings chaotic determination, fractal organisation and fuzzy boundaries into contact with psychological and social explanation, without reducing these notions to a fashionable vocabulary of indeterminacy. The consequential operation is epistemological: a distinction that appears clean within one theoretical apparatus may become graded, contradictory or scale-dependent under another. What matters is not the licence to call everything complex, but the obligation to specify what a model suppresses when it produces clarity. The intervention crosses social psychology, systems thinking and philosophy of science; it supplies neither a ready-made urban method nor a theory of archives. Its structural importance lies elsewhere. If evidence changes with the conceptual resolution at which it is described, then a neighbourhood survey, a walking account and an archival classification cannot be presumed to register the same object merely because they refer to the same place.